A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES的读后感大全

《A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES》是一本由Ray Dalio著作，November Media Publishing & Consulting Firm出版的Paperback图书，本书定价：GBP 20.92，页数：130，特精心收集的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

　　《A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES》精选点评：

●Very thought-provoking

●这书感觉不是给现在的美国人看的，是给陷入债务泥淖的中国人看的。就是的太啰嗦。

●这本书第一部分以及第二部分的德国超级通胀和美国大萧条写得还不错；第二部分的08年金融危机，可能是因为记忆犹新且介绍的书较多，觉得写的琐碎而条理不清晰；第三部分的文字是机器根据算法写的，读了些感兴趣的案例，要是没有更多背景怕是读了也是白读。跟《原则》一样，Dalio的书写的又啰嗦又乏味。

●大师就是大师，债务周期之所以没人研究清楚，是因为一般人一生只能遇到一个。之前看过简单版，目前开始认真研究完整版

●比较认真的看完了第一部分，后面两部分的归纳法论述实在没耐心看下去了……

●通缩型债务危机和通胀型债务危机。

●Ray Dalio 于9月10日发布了新作《A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES》（我们译作《穿越债务危机》）

●为什么这么长？:P An In-depth Look at Deleveragings，看这个就行了。

●桥水达里奥基于债务周期解释经济危机。

●1,危机要增发货币，因为如果勒紧裤腰带，一个人的消费就是另一个人的收入，整个社会都会收入降低 2，债务重组，好的兼并坏的 3，发生金融危机一定要处理迅速，马上开始增发货币，比如1930年代的教训

《A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES》读后感(一)：一本经济、金融的著作，能如此平衡好深刻和通俗，实在难得

这本书是深刻却又浅显好懂的经典。

说他浅显，是因为Ray Dilio从来都很少使用专业的经济学、金融学术语，分析问题也不是建立在经典的经济教材的理论框架上。他一直都是从基本的常识出发，基于逻辑论证，演绎出一个用来观察宏观问题的理论框架。这里说的常识包括：借钱有助于提升当前的购买力和生产力，但是会有无法还本付息的风险→因此必须把债务投入到能创造价值 带来持续现金回报还本付息的领域→债务用于投机不断地借新还旧将给个人和社会整体带来巨大的风险。这种常识，恐怕是小学生都可以理解的。

说他深刻，是因为他用这种几乎常识的大白话，最终推演出的这个理论框架，不仅能完美地分析这些年来各大经济体产生的问题，还帮助他及时地预判到了次贷危机和欧债危机。这是Ray Dalio最了不起的地方。今年读过不少高层智囊、券商首席的文章，不少人都在文章中引述了Ray Dalio的论点论据，可见即使是中国最顶尖的那批经济学人，也是认同Ray Dalio的。

如果我的朋友让我推荐一本财经方面的书，那肯定就是这本了。

《A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES》读后感(二)：逃不开的债务危机

债务危机在目前商业发展的模式下不可避免，唯一能做的就是减轻危机的痛苦程度以及尽可能的缩短depression的时间。作者将债务危机分为两种：本币债务与外币债务。相对而言，本身债务更容易解决一些，作者的看法就是用释放流动性来对抗可能发生的通缩。但读后总隐隐感觉这是将危机后延的一种办法，或者是将债务展期或者是用通胀来化解，最终都是实现财富会更集中，贫富差距会更大。作为外币危机则更难以解决一些，因为不可避免的面临本身贬值资本外流的恶性循环，所带来的伤害更加大，所以新兴市场国家总逃不过这种魔咒。当下中国杠杆率已经很高，经历2015股市杠杆破裂和2016年以后城镇化房市加杠杆的操作后，可以说我国已经处于债务危机顶点向右部分，也就是在痛苦的去杠杆阶段，这一阶段无疑将是痛苦的，即使是政府在去杠杆的过程中完美拿捏每一个步骤，经济下行的痛苦仍然必须承受。尤其我国国情与美国又自不同，我们很难强行去除居民杠杆（无个人破产法），当然这在另一个角度来讲也可能是优势。结合目前整体外部环境的不利影响，预期我国的去杠杆十分危险。但好在我们属于本币杠杆范畴，且政府对于货币的掌控能力十分强。

另外看了书中列举的所有债务危机的例子，每个周期的时间最少10年，那么如果以这样的平均时长来看，再加上如果没有更突破的技术进步带来生产力的较大提升的话，单纯依靠放水以抵抗通缩的办法未必能有很多改善。

对于投资而言，债市相对股市是一个更好的配置标的。同时应关注人民币突然大幅贬值的可能。在严格控制资本外流后，通过本币的贬值刺激出口同时为债务减负可能是解决当下问题的上佳选择。当然地缘政治以及当权者的考虑是否执行又是另外的考量了。

《A Template For Understanding BIG DEBT CRISES》读后感(三)：笔记

- 您在位置 #106-107的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 上午11:50:36

the question of whether rapid credit/debt growth is a good or bad thing hinges on what that credit produces and how the debt is repaid (i.e., how the debt is serviced).

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- 您在位置 #112-114的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 上午11:51:43

have learned that too little credit/debt growth can create as bad or worse economic problems as having too much, with the costs coming in the form of foregone opportunities.

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- 您在位置 #114-116的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 上午11:52:03

speaking, because credit creates both spending power and debt, whether or not more credit is desirable depends on whether the borrowed money is used productively enough to generate sufficient income to service the debt. If that occurs, the resources will have been well allocated and both

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- 您在位置 #114-116的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 上午11:52:11

because credit creates both spending power and debt, whether or not more credit is desirable depends on whether the borrowed money is used productively enough to generate sufficient income to service the debt.

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- 您在位置 #133-136的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:49:19

Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable.

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- 您在位置 #133-136的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:49:23

Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is

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- 您在位置 #133-136的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:49:29

Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable.

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- 您在位置 #133-137的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:49:33

Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable.

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- 您在位置 #137-140的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:50:55

depends a lot on the willingness and the ability of policy makers to spread out the losses arising from bad debts. I have seen this in all the cases I have lived through and studied. Whether policy makers can do this depends on two factors: 1) whether the debt is denominated in the currency that they control and 2) whether they have influence over how creditors and debtors behave with each other.

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- 您在位置 #133-140的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:00

Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable. For that reason, I am asserting that the downside risks of having a significant amount of debt depends a lot on the willingness and the ability of policy makers to spread out the losses arising from bad debts. I have seen this in all the cases I have lived through and studied. Whether policy makers can do this depends on two factors: 1) whether the debt is denominated in the currency that they control and 2) whether they have influence over how creditors and debtors behave with each other.

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- 您在位置 #137-140的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:09

downside risks of having a significant amount of debt depends a lot on the willingness and the ability of policy makers to spread out the losses arising from bad debts. I have seen this in all the cases I have lived through and studied. Whether policy makers can do this depends on two factors: 1) whether the debt is denominated in the currency that they control and 2) whether they have influence over how creditors and debtors behave with each other.

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- 您在位置 #134-137的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:18

loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable.

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- 您在位置 #133-137的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:24

been when roughly 40 percent of a loan’s value couldn’t be paid back. Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable.

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- 您在位置 #133-137的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:30

back. Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable.

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- 您在位置 #133-137的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:41

back. Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable.

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- 您在位置 #133-137的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:51:46

Those bad loans amount to about 20 percent of all the outstanding loans, so the losses are equal to about 8 percent of total debt. That total debt, in turn, is equal to about 200 percent of income (e.g., GDP), so the shortfall is roughly equal to 16 percent of GDP. If that cost is “socialized” (i.e., borne by the society as a whole via fiscal and/or monetary policies) and spread over 15 years, it would amount to about 1 percent per year, which is tolerable. Of course, if not spread out, the costs would be intolerable.

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- 您在位置 #169-173的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:56:38

Lending naturally creates self-reinforcing upward movements that eventually reverse to create self-reinforcing downward movements that must reverse in turn. During the upswings, lending supports spending and investment, which in turn supports incomes and asset prices; increased incomes and asset prices support further borrowing and spending on goods and financial assets. The borrowing essentially lifts spending and incomes above the consistent productivity growth of the economy. Near the peak of the upward cycle, lending is based on the expectation that the above-trend growth will continue indefinitely. But, of course, that can’t happen; eventually income will fall below the cost of the loans.

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- 您在位置 #174-181的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:58:52

Economies whose growth is significantly supported by debt-financed building of fixed investments, real estate, and infrastructure are particularly susceptible to large cyclical swings because the fast rates of building those long-lived assets are not sustainable. If you need better housing and you build it, the incremental need to build more housing naturally declines. As spending on housing slows down, so does housing’s impact on growth. Let’s say you have been spending $10 million a year to build an office building (hiring workers, buying steel and concrete, etc.). When the building is finished, the spending will fall to $0 per year, as will the demand for workers and construction materials. From that point forward, growth, income, and the ability to service debt will depend on other demand. This type of cycle—where a strong growth upswing driven by debt-financed real estate, fixed investment, and infrastructure spending is followed by a downswing driven by a debt-challenged slowdown in demand—is very typical of emerging economies because they have so much building to do.

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- 您在位置 #182-185的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:59:22

economies are changes in their competitiveness due to relative changes in their incomes. Typically, they have very cheap labor and bad infrastructure, so they build infrastructure, have an export boom, and experience rising incomes. But the rate of growth due to exports naturally slows as their income levels rise and their wage competitiveness relative to other countries declines. There are many examples of these kinds

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- 您在位置 #174-185的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:59:27

Economies whose growth is significantly supported by debt-financed building of fixed investments, real estate, and infrastructure are particularly susceptible to large cyclical swings because the fast rates of building those long-lived assets are not sustainable. If you need better housing and you build it, the incremental need to build more housing naturally declines. As spending on housing slows down, so does housing’s impact on growth. Let’s say you have been spending $10 million a year to build an office building (hiring workers, buying steel and concrete, etc.). When the building is finished, the spending will fall to $0 per year, as will the demand for workers and construction materials. From that point forward, growth, income, and the ability to service debt will depend on other demand. This type of cycle—where a strong growth upswing driven by debt-financed real estate, fixed investment, and infrastructure spending is followed by a downswing driven by a debt-challenged slowdown in demand—is very typical of emerging economies because they have so much building to do. Contributing further to the cyclicality of emerging countries’ economies are changes in their competitiveness due to relative changes in their incomes. Typically, they have very cheap labor and bad infrastructure, so they build infrastructure, have an export boom, and experience rising incomes. But the rate of growth due to exports naturally slows as their income levels rise and their wage competitiveness relative to other countries declines. There are many examples of these kinds

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- 您在位置 #174-185的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午1:59:36

Economies whose growth is significantly supported by debt-financed building of fixed investments, real estate, and infrastructure are particularly susceptible to large cyclical swings because the fast rates of building those long-lived assets are not sustainable. If you need better housing and you build it, the incremental need to build more housing naturally declines. As spending on housing slows down, so does housing’s impact on growth. Let’s say you have been spending $10 million a year to build an office building (hiring workers, buying steel and concrete, etc.). When the building is finished, the spending will fall to $0 per year, as will the demand for workers and construction materials. From that point forward, growth, income, and the ability to service debt will depend on other demand. This type of cycle—where a strong growth upswing driven by debt-financed real estate, fixed investment, and infrastructure spending is followed by a downswing driven by a debt-challenged slowdown in demand—is very typical of emerging economies because they have so much building to do. Contributing further to the cyclicality of emerging countries’ economies are changes in their competitiveness due to relative changes in their incomes. Typically, they have very cheap labor and bad infrastructure, so they build infrastructure, have an export boom, and experience rising incomes. But the rate of growth due to exports naturally slows as their income levels rise and their wage competitiveness relative to other countries declines. There are many examples of these kinds of cycles (i.e., Japan’s experience over the last 70 years).

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- 您在位置 #187-188的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:00:48

One classic warning sign that a bubble is coming is when an increasing amount of money is being borrowed to make debt service payments, which of course compounds the borrowers’ indebtedness.

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- 您在位置 #189-194的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:02:21

lending standards are imposed, the rates of credit growth and spending slow and more debt service problems emerge. At this point, the top of the upward phase of the debt cycle is at hand. Realizing that credit growth is dangerously fast, the central banks tighten monetary policy to contain it, which often accelerates the decline (though it would have happened anyway, just a bit later). In either case, when the costs of debt service become greater than the amount that can be borrowed to finance spending, the upward cycle reverses. Not only does new lending slow down, but the pressure on debtors to make their payments is increased. The clearer it becomes that debtors are struggling, the less new lending there is. The slowdown in spending and investment that results slows down income growth even further, and asset prices decline.

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- 您在位置 #187-194的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:02:31

One classic warning sign that a bubble is coming is when an increasing amount of money is being borrowed to make debt service payments, which of course compounds the borrowers’ indebtedness. When money and credit growth are curtailed and/or higher lending standards are imposed, the rates of credit growth and spending slow and more debt service problems emerge. At this point, the top of the upward phase of the debt cycle is at hand. Realizing that credit growth is dangerously fast, the central banks tighten monetary policy to contain it, which often accelerates the decline (though it would have happened anyway, just a bit later). In either case, when the costs of debt service become greater than the amount that can be borrowed to finance spending, the upward cycle reverses. Not only does new lending slow down, but the pressure on debtors to make their payments is increased. The clearer it becomes that debtors are struggling, the less new lending there is. The slowdown in spending and investment that results slows down income growth even further, and asset prices decline.

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- 您在位置 #195-196的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:03:32

When borrowers cannot meet their debt service obligations to lending institutions, those lending institutions cannot meet their obligations to their own creditors. Policy makers must handle this by dealing with the lending institutions first.

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- 您在位置 #205-207的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:05:37

The reduction of lending and the spending it was financing going forward. Even after a debt crisis is resolved, it is unlikely that the entities that borrowed too much can generate the same level of spending in the future that they had before the

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- 您在位置 #205-207的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:05:44

The reduction of lending and the spending it was financing going forward. Even after a debt crisis is resolved, it is unlikely that the entities that borrowed too much can generate the same level of spending in the future that they had before the crisis. That has implications that must be considered.

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- 您在位置 #211-211的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:06:25

possible for policy makers to manage them well in almost every case that the debts are denominated in a country’s own currency.

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- 您在位置 #214-217的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:08:03

From my examination of these cases, the biggest risks are not from the debts themselves but from a) the failure of policy makers to do the right things, due to a lack of knowledge and/or lack of authority, and b) the political consequences of making adjustments that hurt some people in the process of helping others. It is from a desire to help reduce these risks that I have written this study.

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- 您在位置 #212-213的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:08:09

the flexibility that policy makers have allows them to spread out the harmful consequences in such ways that big debt problems aren’t really big problems.

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- 您在位置 #212-213的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:08:11

the flexibility that policy makers have allows them to spread out the harmful consequences in such ways that big debt problems aren’t really big problems.

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- 您在位置 #247-248的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:16:06

You will note how the interest payments remain flat or go down even when the debt goes up, so that the rise in debt service costs is not as great as the rise in debt.

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- 您在位置 #290-299的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:24:02

Remember that money serves two purposes: it is a medium of exchange and a store hold of wealth. And because it has two purposes, it serves two masters: 1) those who want to obtain it for “life’s necessities,” usually by working for it, and 2) those who have stored wealth tied to its value. Throughout history these two groups have been called different things—e.g., the first group has been called workers, the proletariat, and “the have-nots,” and the second group has been called capitalists, investors, and “the haves.” For simplicity, we will call the first group proletariat-workers and the second group capitalists-investors. Proletariat-workers earn their money by selling their time and capitalists-investors earn their money by “lending” others the use of their money in exchange for either a) a promise to repay an amount of money that is greater than the loan (which is a debt instrument), or b) a piece of ownership in the business (which we call “equity” or “stocks”) or a piece of another asset (e.g., real estate). These two groups, along with the government (which sets the rules), are the major players in this drama. While generally both groups benefit from borrowing and lending, sometimes one gains and one suffers as a result of the transaction. This is especially true for debtors and creditors.

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- 您在位置 #223-227的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:29:55

There are four types of levers that policy makers can pull to bring debt and debt service levels down relative to the income and cash flow levels that are required to service them: Austerity (i.e., spending less) Debt defaults/restructurings The central bank “printing money” and making purchases (or providing guarantees) Transfers of money and credit from those who have more than they need to those who have

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- 您在位置 #223-227的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:29:59

There are four types of levers that policy makers can pull to bring debt and debt service levels down relative to the income and cash flow levels that are required to service them: Austerity (i.e., spending less) Debt defaults/restructurings The central bank “printing money” and making purchases (or providing guarantees) Transfers of money and credit from those who have more than they need to those who have less

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- 您在位置 #362-383的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:40:06

The Start of a Bubble: The Bull Market Bubbles usually start as over-extrapolations of justified bull markets. The bull markets are initially justified because lower interest rates make investment assets, such as stocks and real estate, more attractive so they go up, and economic conditions improve, which leads to economic growth and corporate profits, improved balance sheets, and the ability to take on more debt—all of which make the companies worth more. As assets go up in value, net worths and spending/income levels rise. Investors, business people, financial intermediaries, and policy makers increase their confidence in ongoing prosperity, which supports the leveraging-up process. The boom also encourages new buyers who don’t want to miss out on the action to enter the market, fueling the emergence of a bubble. Quite often, uneconomic lending and the bubble occur because of implicit or explicit government guarantees that encourage lending institutions to lend recklessly. As new speculators and lenders enter the market and confidence increases, credit standards fall. Banks lever up and new types of lending institutions that are largely unregulated develop (these non-bank lending institutions are referred to collectively as a “shadow banking” system). These shadow banking institutions are typically less under the blanket of government protections. At these times, new types of lending vehicles are frequently invented and a lot of financial engineering takes place. The lenders and the speculators make a lot of fast, easy money, which reinforces the bubble by increasing the speculators’ equity, giving them the collateral they need to secure new loans. At the time, most people don’t think that is a problem; to the contrary, they think that what is happening is a reflection and confirmation of the boom. This phase of the cycle typically feeds on itself. Taking stocks as an example, rising stock prices lead to more spending and investment, which raises earnings, which raises stock prices, which lowers credit spreads and encourages increased lending (based on the increased value of collateral and higher earnings), which affects spending and investment rates, etc. During such times, most people think the assets are a fabulous treasure to own—and consider anyone who doesn’t own them to be missing out. As a result of this dynamic, all sorts of entities build up long positions. Large asset-liability mismatches increase in the forms of a) borrowing short-term to lend long-term, b) taking on liquid liabilities to invest in illiquid assets, and c) investing in riskier debt or other risky assets with money borrowed from others, and/or d) borrowing in one currency and lending in another, all to pick up a perceived spread. All the while, debts rise fast and debt service costs rise even faster. The charts below paint the picture.

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- 您在位置 #387-387的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:41:45

humans by nature (like most species) tend to move in crowds and weigh recent experience more heavily than is appropriate.

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- 您在位置 #393-394的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:45:32

Bubbles are most likely to occur at the tops in the business cycle, balance of payments cycle, and/or long-term debt cycle.

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- 您在位置 #394-395的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:46:13

a bubble nears its top, the economy is most vulnerable, but people are feeling the wealthiest and the most bullish.

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- 您在位置 #428-428的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:54:51

the most defining characteristics of bubbles that can be measured are:

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- 您在位置 #429-435的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:55:00

Prices are high relative to traditional measures Prices are discounting future rapid price appreciation from these high levels There is broad bullish sentiment Purchases are being financed by high leverage Buyers have made exceptionally extended forward purchases (e.g., built inventory, contracted for supplies, etc.) to speculate or to protect themselves against future price gains New buyers (i.e., those who weren’t previously in the market) have entered the market Stimulative monetary policy threatens to inflate the bubble even more (and tight policy to cause its popping)

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- 您在位置 #436-437的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:56:23

As you can see in the table below, which is based on our systematic measures, most or all of these indications were present in past bubbles. (N/A indicates inadequate data.)

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- 您在位置 #439-440的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:58:23

The ratio of debt to income for the economy as a whole, or even debt service payments to income for the economy as a whole, which is better, are useful but ultimately inadequate measures.

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- 您在位置 #439-444的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:58:44

The ratio of debt to income for the economy as a whole, or even debt service payments to income for the economy as a whole, which is better, are useful but ultimately inadequate measures. To anticipate a debt crisis well, one has to look at the specific debt-service abilities of the individual entities, which are lost in these averages. More specifically, a high level of debt or debt service to income is less problematic if the average is well distributed across the economy than if it is concentrated—especially if it is concentrated in key entities. 3) The Top When prices have been driven by a lot of leveraged buying and the market gets fully long, leveraged, and overpriced, it becomes ripe for a reversal.

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- 您在位置 #439-444的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:59:02

The ratio of debt to income for the economy as a whole, or even debt service payments to income for the economy as a whole, which is better, are useful but ultimately inadequate measures. To anticipate a debt crisis well, one has to look at the specific debt-service abilities of the individual entities, which are lost in these averages. More specifically, a high level of debt or debt service to income is less problematic if the average is well distributed across the economy than if it is concentrated—especially if it is concentrated in key entities. 3) The Top When prices have been driven by a lot of leveraged buying and the market gets fully long, leveraged, and overpriced, it becomes ripe for a reversal.

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- 您在位置 #439-442的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:59:11

The ratio of debt to income for the economy as a whole, or even debt service payments to income for the economy as a whole, which is better, are useful but ultimately inadequate measures. To anticipate a debt crisis well, one has to look at the specific debt-service abilities of the individual entities, which are lost in these averages. More specifically, a high level of debt or debt service to income is less problematic if the average is well distributed across the economy than

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- 您在位置 #439-442的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午2:59:29

The ratio of debt to income for the economy as a whole, or even debt service payments to income for the economy as a whole, which is better, are useful but ultimately inadequate measures. To anticipate a debt crisis well, one has to look at the specific debt-service abilities of the individual entities, which are lost in these averages. More specifically, a high level of debt or debt service to income is less problematic if the average is well distributed across the economy than if it is concentrated—especially if it is concentrated

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- 您在位置 #458-459的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午3:03:22

Typically, these types of credit/debt problems start to emerge about half a year ahead of the peak in the economy,

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- 您在位置 #459-460的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午3:03:40

The riskiest debtors start to miss payments, lenders begin to worry, credit spreads start to tick up, and risky lending slows.

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- 您在位置 #473-474的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午3:06:09

The more leverage that exists and the higher the prices, the less tightening it takes to prick the bubble and the bigger the bust that follows.

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- 您在位置 #486-490的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午3:08:57

In normal recessions (when monetary policy is still effective), the imbalance between the amount of money and the need for it to service debt can be rectified by cutting interest rates enough to 1) produce a positive wealth effect, 2) stimulate economic activity, and 3) ease debt-service burdens. This can’t happen in depressions, because interest rates can’t be cut materially because they have either already reached close to 0 percent or, in cases where currency outflows and currency weaknesses are great, the floor on interest rates is higher because of credit or currency risk considerations.

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- 您在位置 #509-514的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月22日星期一 下午3:13:19

A solvency problem means that, according to accounting and regulatory rules, the entity does not have enough equity capital to operate—i.e., it is “broke” and must be shut down. So, the accounting laws have a big impact on the severity of the debt problem at this moment. A cash-flow problem means that an entity doesn’t have enough cash to meet its needs, typically because its own lenders are taking money away from it—i.e., there is a “run.” A cash-flow problem can occur even when the entity has adequate capital because the equity is in illiquid assets. Lack of cash flow is an immediate and severe problem—and as a result, the trigger and main issue of most debt crises.

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- 您在位置 #551-552的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午12:24:53

assets need to be sold and spending needs to be cut in order to raise cash. This leads asset values to fall, which reduces the value of collateral,

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- 您在位置 #551-552的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午12:25:01

assets need to be sold and spending needs to be cut in order to raise cash.

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- 您在位置 #564-565的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午12:27:17

Even as debts are written down, debt burdens rise as spending and incomes fall. Debt levels also rise relative to net worth, as shown in the chart below.

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- 您在位置 #582-591的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午12:30:31

printing, and redistribution wrong initially. Taxpayers are understandably angry at the debtors and at the financial institutions whose excesses caused the debt crisis, and don’t want the government (i.e., their taxes) to bail them out. And policy makers justifiably believe that debt excesses will happen again if lenders and borrowers don’t suffer the downsides of their actions (which is called the “moral hazard” problem). For all these reasons, policy makers are usually reluctant and slow to provide government supports, and the debt contraction and the agony it produces increase quickly. But the longer they wait to apply stimulative remedies to the mix, the uglier the deleveraging becomes.8 Eventually they choose to provide a lot of guarantees, print a lot of money, and monetize a lot of debt, which lifts the economy into a reflationary deleveraging. If they do these things and get the mix right quickly, the depression is much more likely to be relatively short-lived (like the short period of “depression” following the US crisis in 2008). If they don’t, the depression is usually prolonged (like the Great Depression in the 1930s, or Japan’s “lost decade” following its bubble in the late 1980s).

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- 您在位置 #582-591的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午12:30:36

Policy makers typically get the mix between austerity, money printing, and redistribution wrong initially. Taxpayers are understandably angry at the debtors and at the financial institutions whose excesses caused the debt crisis, and don’t want the government (i.e., their taxes) to bail them out. And policy makers justifiably believe that debt excesses will happen again if lenders and borrowers don’t suffer the downsides of their actions (which is called the “moral hazard” problem). For all these reasons, policy makers are usually reluctant and slow to provide government supports, and the debt contraction and the agony it produces increase quickly. But the longer they wait to apply stimulative remedies to the mix, the uglier the deleveraging becomes.8 Eventually they choose to provide a lot of guarantees, print a lot of money, and monetize a lot of debt, which lifts the economy into a reflationary deleveraging. If they do these things and get the mix right quickly, the depression is much more likely to be relatively short-lived (like the short period of “depression” following the US crisis in 2008). If they don’t, the depression is usually prolonged (like the Great Depression in the 1930s, or Japan’s “lost decade” following its bubble in the late 1980s).

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- 您在位置 #658-661的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:06:31

Typically, nonsystemically important institutions are forced to absorb their losses, and if they fail, are allowed to go bankrupt. The resolution of these institutions can take several different forms. In many cases (about 80 percent of the cases we studied), they are merged with healthy institutions. In some other cases, the assets are liquidated or transferred to an “asset-management company” (AMC) set up by the government to be sold piecemeal.

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- 您在位置 #711-716的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:11:06

Wealth gaps increase during bubbles and they become particularly galling for the less privileged during hard times. As a general rule, if rich people share a budget with poor people and there is an economic downturn, there will be economic and political conflict. It is during such times that populism on both the left and the right tends to emerge. How well the people and the political system handle this is key to how well the economy and the society weather the period. As shown below, both inequality and populism are on the rise in the US today, much as they were in the 1930s. In both cases, the net worth of the top 0.1 percent of the population equaled approximately that of the bottom 90 percent combined.

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- 您在位置 #729-733的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:14:13

A “beautiful deleveraging” happens when the four levers are moved in a balanced way so as to reduce intolerable shocks and produce positive growth with falling debt burdens and acceptable inflation. More specifically, deleveragings become beautiful when there is enough stimulation (i.e., through “printing of money”/debt monetization and currency devaluation) to offset the deflationary deleveraging forces (austerity/defaults) and bring the nominal growth rate above the nominal interest rate—but not so much stimulation that inflation is accelerated, the currency is devaluated, and a new debt bubble arises.

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- 您在位置 #734-738的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:16:04

The best way of negating the deflationary depression is for the central bank to provide adequate liquidity and credit support, and, depending on different key entities’ needs for capital, for the central government to provide that too. Recall that spending comes in the form of either money or credit. When increased spending cannot be financed with increased debt because there is too much debt relative to the amount of money there is to service the debt, increased spending and debt-service relief must come from increased money. This means that the central bank has to increase the amount of money in the system.

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- 您在位置 #741-742的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:18:20

b) get the nominal growth rate marginally above the nominal interest rate to tolerably spread out the deleveraging process.

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- 您在位置 #746-748的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:18:35

So for the burdens from existing debt not to increase, nominal income growth must be higher than nominal interest rates, and the higher the better (provided it is not so high that it produces unacceptable inflation and/or unacceptable currency declines).

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- 您在位置 #748-749的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:19:44

People ask if printing money will raise inflation. It won’t if it offsets falling credit and the deflationary forces are balanced with this reflationary force.

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- 您在位置 #750-752的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:20:21

Remember, spending is what matters. A dollar of spending paid for with money has the same effect on prices as a dollar of spending paid for with credit. By “printing money,” the central bank can make up for the disappearance of credit with an increase in the amount of money. This

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- 您在位置 #750-754的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:21:02

Remember, spending is what matters. A dollar of spending paid for with money has the same effect on prices as a dollar of spending paid for with credit. By “printing money,” the central bank can make up for the disappearance of credit with an increase in the amount of money. This “printing” takes the form of central bank purchases of government securities and nongovernment assets such as corporate securities, equities, and other assets, which is reflected in money growing at an extremely fast rate at the same time as credit and real economic activity are contracting.

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- 您在位置 #771-774的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:23:41

Typically, governments with gold-, commodity-, or foreign-currency-pegged money systems are forced to have tighter monetary policies to protect the value of their currency than governments with fiat monetary systems. But eventually the debt contractions become so painful that they relent, break the link, and print (i.e., either they abandon these systems or change the amount/pricing of the commodity that they will exchange for a unit of money).

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- 您在位置 #788-790的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:25:40

On average, this aggressive stimulation comes two to three years into the depression, after stocks have fallen more than 50 percent, economic activity has fallen about 10 percent, and unemployment has risen to around 10 to 15 percent, though there is a lot of variation.

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- 您在位置 #794-797的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:27:20

reiterate, the key to having a beautiful deleveraging lies in balancing the inflationary forces against the deflationary ones. That’s because too much money printing can also produce an ugly inflationary deleveraging (which we will go through later). The right amounts of stimulus are those that a) neutralize what would otherwise be a deflationary credit-market collapse and b) get the nominal growth rate above the nominal interest rate by enough to relieve the debt burdens,

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- 您在位置 #794-797的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:27:25

reiterate, the key to having a beautiful deleveraging lies in balancing the inflationary forces against the deflationary ones. That’s because too much money printing can also produce an ugly inflationary deleveraging (which we will go through later). The right amounts of stimulus are those that a) neutralize what would otherwise be a deflationary credit-market collapse and b) get the nominal growth rate above the nominal interest rate by enough to relieve the debt burdens, but not by so much that it leads to a run on debt assets.

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- 您在位置 #803-804的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:41:15

Central banks use macroprudential policies to target restraints in debt growth where bubbles are emerging and allow debt growth where it is not excessive.

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- 您在位置 #806-808的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:41:55

Big bubbles are fueled by speculators and lenders over-extrapolating past successes and making further debt-financed investments, and by central banks focusing just on inflation and/or growth and not considering debt bubbles in investment assets, thus keeping credit cheap for too long.

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- 您在位置 #815-817的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:45:44

Central banks provide ample liquidity, ease short rates quickly until they hit 0%, and then pursue aggressive monetizations, using aggressive targeted macroprudential policies.

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- 您在位置 #827-827的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:47:06

high-quality credit growth.

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- 您在位置 #850-851的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:59:03

“Quantitative easing” (QE) as it is now called (i.e., “printing money” and buying financial assets, typically debt assets), is Monetary Policy 2.

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- 您在位置 #856-857的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午10:59:54

QE certainly benefits investors/savers (i.e., those who own financial assets) much more than people who don’t, thus widening the wealth gap.

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- 您在位置 #853-854的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午11:00:00

What they do with that money and credit makes all the difference in the world.

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- 您在位置 #858-859的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午11:01:44

it is most effective when risk and liquidity premiums are large, because it causes those premiums to fall.

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- 您在位置 #881-881的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午11:04:02

This typically happens in the later years of the long-term debt cycle (e.g., 1937-38 and now in the US), which

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- 您在位置 #884-884的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午11:06:23

Monetary Policy 3 puts money more directly into the hands of spenders instead of investors/savers and incentivizes them to spend

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- 您在位置 #884-886的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 上午11:06:29

Because wealthy people have fewer incentives to spend the incremental money and credit they get than less wealthy people, when the wealth gap is large and the economy is weak, directing spending opportunities at less wealthy people is more productive.

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- 您在位置 #924-928的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午1:46:10

Eventually the system gets back to normal, though the recovery in economic activity and capital formation tends to be slow, even during a beautiful deleveraging. It typically takes roughly 5 to 10 years (hence the term “lost decade”) for real economic activity to reach its former peak level. And it typically takes longer, around a decade, for stock prices to reach former highs, because it takes a very long time for investors to become comfortable taking the risk of holding equities again (i.e., equity risk premiums are high).

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- 您在位置 #969-972的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午1:50:05

(all else being equal) If a currency falls in relation to another currency at a rate that is greater than the currency’s interest rate, the holder of the debt in the weakening currency will lose money. If investors expect that weakness to continue without being compensated with higher interest rates, a dangerous currency dynamic will develop.

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- 您在位置 #969-972的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午1:50:10

(all else being equal) If a currency falls in relation to another currency at a rate that is greater than the currency’s interest rate, the holder of the debt in the weakening currency will lose money. If investors expect that weakness to continue without being compensated with higher interest rates, a dangerous currency dynamic will develop.

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- 您在位置 #970-972的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午1:50:13

If a currency falls in relation to another currency at a rate that is greater than the currency’s interest rate, the holder of the debt in the weakening currency will lose money. If investors expect that weakness to continue without being compensated with higher interest rates, a dangerous currency dynamic will develop.

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- 您在位置 #992-993的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午1:53:43

c) the currency depreciates much more than inflation picks up, so that the country’s assets and the items it sells to the world become so competitively priced that its balance of payments improves.

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- 您在位置 #1041-1041的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:28:44

“foreign-exchange reserves.”

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- 您在位置 #1045-1046的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:30:13

Since central banks need to create more money to buy the foreign currency, doing that increases the amount of domestic currency funds to either buy assets (causing asset prices to rise) or lend out.

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- 您在位置 #1086-1087的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:35:43

and the country typically becomes highly reliant on foreign financing.

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- 您在位置 #1083-1085的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:36:03

As the bubble emerges, there are fewer productive investments, and at the same time there is more capital going after them. The fundamental attractiveness of the country that sparked the boom fades, in part because

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- 您在位置 #1083-1087的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:36:17

As the bubble emerges, there are fewer productive investments, and at the same time there is more capital going after them. The fundamental attractiveness of the country that sparked the boom fades, in part because the rising currency is eroding the country’s competitiveness. During this stage, growth is increasingly financed by debt rather than productivity gains, and the country typically becomes highly reliant on foreign financing. This shows up in foreign currency denominated debt rising.

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- 您在位置 #1119-1122的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:41:40

The circumstances that could set off such a crisis are akin to what might set off financial difficulties for a family or individual—a loss of income or credit tightening, a big increase in costs (such as rising gasoline or heating oil prices), or having borrowed so much that repayment becomes difficult. Any one of these shocks would create a gap between the amount of money coming in and the amount of money being spent, which has to be closed somehow.

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- 您在位置 #1179-1181的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午2:44:49

Usually, this currency defense phase of the cycle is relatively brief, in the vicinity of six months, with reserves drawn down about 10 to 20 percent before the defense is abandoned.

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- 您在位置 #1370-1370的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午3:49:39

psychology

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- 您在位置 #1448-1451的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月23日星期二 下午3:58:53

When 1) within countries there are economic conflicts between the rich/capitalist/political right and the poor/proletariat/political left that lead to conflicts that result in populist, autocratic, nationalistic, and militaristic leaders coming to power, while at the same time, 2) between countries there are conflicts arising among comparably strong economic and military powers, the relationships between economics and politics become especially intertwined—and the probabilities of disruptive conflicts (e.g., wars) become much higher than normal.

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- 您在位置 #1462-1468的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:27:41

Cooperative-competitive relationships in which the parties take into consideration what’s really important to the other and try to give it to them in exchange for what they most want. In this type of win-win relationship, there are often tough negotiations that are done with respect and consideration, like two friendly merchants in a bazaar or two friendly teams on the field. Mutually threatening relationships in which the parties think about how they can harm the other and exchange painful acts in the hope of forcing the other into a position of fear so that they will give in. In this type of lose-lose relationship, they interact through “war” rather than through “negotiation.”

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- 您在位置 #1477-1477的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:29:12

terms of economic policy, during a war period, the most important priority is to maintain one’s access to financial and non-financial resources

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- 您在位置 #1479-1480的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:29:39

The access to borrowing very much depends on each county’s creditworthiness and the development of its capital markets,

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- 您在位置 #1480-1480的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:29:56

especially the soundness of its own local currency debt market.

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- 您在位置 #1483-1484的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:30:49

The worst thing a country, hence a country’s leader, could ever do is get into a lot of debt and lose a war

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- 您在位置 #1507-1508的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:34:33

managing debt crises is all about spreading out the pain of the bad debts, and this can almost always be done well if one’s debts are in one’s own currency. The biggest risks are typically not from the debts themselves,

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- 您在位置 #1507-1508的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:34:38

managing debt crises is all about spreading out the pain of the bad debts, and this can almost always be done well if one’s debts are in one’s own currency.

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- 您在位置 #6137-6138的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:37:52

new ways of providing leverage outside the protection and regulation of authorities.

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- 您在位置 #6139-6142的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:38:35

providing you with this narrative, I’m also hoping to convey an up-close feeling of what it was like to go through the experience day-by-day. I encourage you, at each point, to think about what you would do a) as an investor and b) as a policy maker. I will give you that experience by describing the timeline week-by-week (and sometimes day-by-day), while showing a “newsfeed” at the end of the chapter (primarily New York Times articles).

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- 您在位置 #6152-6153的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:40:51

This made the 2001 recession a short-lived and shallow one, but it set the stage for the subsequent bubble period, which was building most rapidly between 2004 and 2006.

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- 您在位置 #6156-6159的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:44:17

At the same time, the economy was classically entering its “late cycle” phase as capacity constraints began to appear (e.g., the GDP gap was 2 percent and growth in demand was above growth in capacity). Financial and housing markets were very strong, financed by debt. The Federal Reserve, focusing on growth, inflation, and the GDP gap more than debt growth, increased interest rates gradually, from the lows of 1 percent in 2004 to just over 5 percent in 2006.

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- 您在位置 #6162-6164的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:45:32

Debt/GDP grew at an average rate of 12.6 percent during the period. Typically that’s when bubbles emerge because central banks focus on inflation and growth (which isn’t a problem) and they don’t adequately worry about debt-financed purchases of investment assets.

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- 您在位置 #6168-6169的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:46:58

From 2004 to 2006, home prices increased around 30 percent and had increased more than 80 percent since 2000,

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- 您在位置 #6175-6176的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:48:05

all income quintiles increased their debt substantially over the period, the biggest percentage increase in debt between 2001 and

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- 您在位置 #6175-6176的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午9:48:11

all income quintiles increased their debt substantially over the period,

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- 您在位置 #6179-6180的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:23:44

That pushed overall US debt to over 300 percent of GDP.

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- 您在位置 #6193-6194的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:28:26

“home flippers” would buy a home, do some renovations, and aim to take advantage of rising prices to make a short-term profit).

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- 您在位置 #6197-6198的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:29:41

just shy of 8 percent of households were buying a home each year

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- 您在位置 #6200的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:29:48

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- 您在位置 #6207-6208的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:32:10

there was a mania to lend to people to buy houses. The chart on the left on the next page shows aggregate mortgage rates. As a result of the Fed’s easy monetary policies, they fell

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- 您在位置 #6207-6207的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:32:19

there was a mania to lend to people to buy houses. The

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- 您在位置 #6213-6213的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:33:41

“Subprime” mortgages (e.g., riskier ones) became 20 percent of the market.

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- 您在位置 #6216-6217的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:34:55

For all of the debt build-up and frenzied housing activity, the economy didn’t overheat and inflation remained moderate, so the Fed,

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- 您在位置 #6217-6221的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:35:19

It is typically the case that the worst debt bubbles (e.g., the US in 1929, Japan in 1989) are not accompanied by high and rising goods and services inflation, but by asset price inflation financed by debt growth. Typically, central banks make the mistake of accommodating the debt growth because they are focused on goods and services inflation (as measured by the CPI) and/or growth. They are not focused on debt growth, which is what they are creating, and on whether the debts will produce the incomes to service them,

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- 您在位置 #6247-6247的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:40:52

The broader economy also showed signs of a bubble.

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- 您在位置 #6251的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:41:03

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- 您在位置 #6248-6248的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:41:21

sucked in capital from abroad.

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- 您在位置 #6248-6249的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:41:36

manufacturing employment fell and the US was rapidly losing global export market share to emerging countries, especially China. However, the increase in housing-related activity camouflaged

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- 您在位置 #6252的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:41:50

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- 您在位置 #6248-6252的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:41:59

manufacturing employment fell and the US was rapidly losing global export market share to emerging countries, especially China. However, the increase in housing-related activity camouflaged this; for instance, construction employment in support of building houses increasingly financed by debt rose by around 50 percent compared to 1995. In addition,

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- 您在位置 #6248-6253的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:42:08

manufacturing employment fell and the US was rapidly losing global export market share to emerging countries, especially China. However, the increase in housing-related activity camouflaged this; for instance, construction employment in support of building houses increasingly financed by debt rose by around 50 percent compared to 1995. In addition, a lot of money to fund consumption was also borrowed via mortgages and other types of debt instruments.

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- 您在位置 #6261-6261的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:44:15

Many of these flows went to lending that would not produce the income to service the debts.

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- 您在位置 #6261-6264的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:44:36

Many of these flows went to lending that would not produce the income to service the debts. They supported a dynamic that was unsustainable: The savings rate can’t fall indefinitely, and the wave of lending can’t increase forever. As the debts came due, there would be cash flow problems. When we ran our pro forma financial numbers, we could see that when all these flows tapered off, there would be cash flow problems.

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- 您在位置 #6269-6270的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:45:23

Without having been through a crisis to stress-test them, it can be hard to tell if they really are as safe as they’re made out to be.

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- 您在位置 #6294-6296的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:49:03

it was not just low interest rates that fueled the bubble, but rather a combination of easy money, lax regulation, and risky financial innovations. As the Fed was looking at inflation and not debt growth when setting interest rates, and as policy makers allowed the lax regulation of shadow lending channels to continue, the bubble was allowed to grow.

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- 您在位置 #6321-6322的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:53:32

“[t]here is a broad recognition that, with the refinancing and real estate booms over, the business model of many of the

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- 您在位置 #6321-6322的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午10:53:35

“[t]here is a broad recognition that, with the refinancing and real estate booms over, the business model of many of the smaller subprime originators is no longer viable.”7

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- 您在位置 #6328-6328的标注 | 添加于 2018年10月24日星期三 上午11:11:38

bigger banks were starting to re