《Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus》读后感100字

《Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus》是一本由Ludwig Wittgenstein著作，Routledge出版的Paperback图书，本书定价：USD 19.95，页数：89，特精心收集的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

《Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus》读后感(一)：电影《维特根斯坦》最后的寓言对这本书和哲学本身的理解非常有用

最近看西部世界，得到了很多启发。如果我们人类就是困于自身的机器人，我们是否有想像和理解“公园”外“真实的世界”的可能？

在Tractatus里，维特根斯坦把全部语言(或者说表达，思维)简化为“A对于B对于C的关系的各种排列组合”的逻辑公式，纯净如冰，然而在完美的冰面上行走人是要摔跤的，错误，歧义，混乱。。。所有的不完美是让我们不摔跤的摩擦力，这才是真实世界。也许这就是为什么维在后来否定了Tractatus的原因吧。

寓言的最后一段：我们无法解开自身之谜，因为我们被困于自身之中，就像二维生物无法想象三维。所以困于时空之中的生命谜题，解开它的钥匙在时空之外。同理，我们的哲思局限于我们的语言，维特根斯坦看到了这个困局，但同为使用语言来思考的人类，他也无法突破。这也许就是之前那篇亚马逊书评里说的："Tractatus是一个把你的整个哲学”硬盘“擦除的程序，其最后一步运算是清除自己。在这终极清理以后，我们从哲学中解脱，在振聋发聩的沉默中重归平凡世界，那沉默即是我们对”das Mystiche" - 在平凡之内和之上的神秘 - 的认可。"

”这个谜并不存在“这句话还不是特别理解，求教。

-------电影最后的寓言--------------

曾经有个年轻人，他梦想把世界简化为纯粹的逻辑。他非常聪明，所以确实做到了。任务完成时，他站那儿欣赏着自己的杰作，一个非常美丽，摒除了不完美和不确定的新世界，象闪耀的冰面无边无际的延伸到天边。那个聪明的年轻人环视他所创造的世界，决定探索它。可是当他向前迈出第一步，立即摔倒了。你看，他忘了摩擦力。冰面平坦光滑，洁净无瑕，但是人无法在上面行走。年轻人坐在那里伤心痛哭。 当他成长为一个智慧的老人时，他开始理解粗糙和混沌并不是缺陷，世界就是因此而运转。他想奔跑舞蹈，顿时语言失去光泽，模糊不清；世界支离破碎，散落一地。智慧的老人知道这就是事物的本来面目。但在他的内心有块地方依然怀念着那片纯净的冰面，那里的一切闪耀着纯粹的光芒。虽然他甚至已经日渐喜欢那坑坑洼洼的地面，但无法让自己在那里安顿下来。所以他困在地面和冰面之间，哪里都不是他的归宿。这是他所有悲痛的来由。

....

时空中生命之谜的解释处于时空之外。。。这个迷并不存在。。。如果一个问题竟然能被问出来，那它就有答案。

The solution to the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time...The riddle does not exist...If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.

《Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus》读后感(二)：维维的“魔荣之|Psyche Philosophiae”

The expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions expresses the truth-conditions of a proposition. A proposition is the expression of its truthconditions.

Thus Frege was quite right to use them as a starting point when he explained the signs of his conceptual notation. But the explanation of the concept of truth that Frege gives is mistaken: if ‘the true’ and ‘the false’ were really objects, and were the arguments in ∼p etc., then Frege’s method of determining the sense of ‘∼p’ would leave it absolutely undetermined.

------ Wittgenstein (4-3-31)

这个的实质是链接“观否二卦”，本质则是【禮兿·吉】+【射藝·井儀】。当【乾坎】存在的时候，【坤离】作为它的“反物质”也是存在的。——是谓之：煮酒乾坤，心灵和智慧作为意义本身和改变创化进程的宇宙位置存在，如是之。

话，往俗的方向说：

why not "∼p"？既然是对的，为何不定死BK的？既然此会如是，为何不全部都如是？

往更俗的方向说便是：

凡绝对形式逻辑逻辑正确的，其心灵世界必然是个“痞子”！

（尤其包括法学院和神学院修的那堆逻辑课程）

乾坤煮酒。不懂孔子认识论，理解维特根斯坦会非常困难。因为那是唯一相对完整的【Principium Asperum|易注】。【Cabbalus|卦】，et factum est ita，用卡巴拉也成，反正是缪勒和维维的共享密码系统；两边都能看的情况下，我吹“爱国哨”：我薯万年！Philosophy of Psychology，不是数学逻辑领域的划归兴趣。论题本质上都是“Anima|雩”的，魔法是有的，惰性也会是极强的。芝诺吾上万年！

（Sweet Dream，Anyway：丹胖子的那本书在我心中的地位又降级了）

孔子言性善，荀子言性恶。辙，何以产生、通向何处？

维维如是炸出。

心灵逻辑，必须加上那个约翰穆勒：一只老狐狸，带了一只小狐狸。卡巴拉随便了，但，谁能受累跟我把孔子认识论从骑马射箭的草原状态拉回来？？

《Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus》读后感(三)：贴一篇亚马逊上近400点赞的书评

本来是随手翻看书评，找了篇点赞最多的点进去。一下被那种清晰、有力、简洁的语言吸引了。 明明是”枯燥“”正经“的哲学论文，书评的最后一段却出人意料地拨动人的心弦：So this book is a kind of curative "nonsense", like a purgative for the soul; it is meant to cleanse the mind of philosophical confusion (that is, of philosophy itself) and, at the end, to remove itself as the final piece of "confusion". To use a computer metaphor, the Tractatus is a program that wipes your whole philosophical "hard drive", and erases itself as its final operation. And after that final erasure, we return to the ordinary world, free of philosophy, in the deafening silence that is our acknowledgement of "das Mystiche"--the mystical in, and above, the ordinary. ---------这本书有点像治愈人的“扯淡“，像灵魂的炼狱；它想荡涤头脑中的哲学迷思（其实就是哲学本身），并最终将自己作为最后的”迷思“清除掉。用计算机术语来比喻就是，Tractatus是一个把你的整个哲学”硬盘“擦除的程序，其最后一步运算是清除自己。在这终极清理以后，我们从哲学中解脱，在振聋发聩的沉默中重归平凡世界，那沉默即是我们对”das Mystiche" - 俗世之内及超越俗世的神秘 - 的认可。 实在喜欢这个书评就开始看这位评家的其他书评，发现几乎都是05年以前的。好奇心使然去人肉，链到了朋友，同事和家人为他建的网站，看了”about"，原来这位评家是位哲学博士，2008年30多岁时就英年早逝了。而他的朋友同事描述他的哲学的话也让人动容：Desire to see things better, trust in one’s own headlights, hope that they will light the windy way, and love to embrace the truth we find and live it: this is Sophia. The desire requires the trust in our own abilities, the trust implies that we have hope, and the hope implies that we love what we hope to get: they are not many but one, wisdom, as Guha might have said. Philosophy began for him with technical questions about the certainty of scientific theories and it led him beyond the merely technical to a way of living the life of the mind, a way anyone can see the value in. --------书评原文如下-------- By S. Guha Since most of the reviews of the Tractatus here contain either fawning praise or vituperation without much expository content, it may perhaps be useful to give an account, in reasonably clear terms, of what this book is actually about. Granted that my account is somewhat simplified, it will still be better than quasi-mystical gushing praise or bitter unargued criticism. The central idea of the Tractatus is expressed very clearly at proposition 4.01 and certain comments following it: "A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it." ［4.01］ "At first sight a proposition--one set out on the printed page, for example--does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music . . . And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they represent." ［4.011］ "A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. They are all construed according to a common logical pattern." ［4.014］ So, Wittgenstein's basic view in the Tractatus is simple: statements ("propositions") are pictures or models of the situations they are about. The sequence of words "The cat is on the mat" would be taken by him to picture the situation that consists in one object (the cat) standing in a certain relation (being on) to another object (the mat). Or rather, this would be the way to understand this proposition if the cat and mat themselves were indivisible atoms, without any smaller parts. Since, actually, the cat is made up of a great many smaller parts, as is the mat, the full analysis of "The cat is on the mat" would be much more complicated. But basically, a proposition is a picture of the situation it describes just as the notes on a sheet of music depict a melody, and just as the written letters "pop" depict a certain sound. In breaking down the cat and the mat, we must eventually come to a point where things can't be broken down any further, with objects that are the basic constituents of reality. The relationships between these basic objects, which Wittgenstein just calls "objects", but which others have called "logical atoms", constitute the most elementary situations. These situations are described by what he calls "elementary propositions". Given a bunch of elementary propositions, we can combine and re-combine them by certain basic operations, called truth-functional operations, which are explained in any textbook of elementary formal logic. Two such operations are conjunction and negation. So, given three atoms, a, b, and c, and a relation R (R might be the relation "being on", as with the cat and the mat), we have, as elementary propositions, for instance: aRb ("a is on b") bRc ("b is on c") aRc ("a is on c") Then we can make new, compound propositions like (aRb & bRc) ~aRc (aRb & bRc) & ~aRc Where "&" just means "and", as in "The cat is on the mat and the cherry is on the tree", and "~" means "It is not the case that", as in "It is not the case that the cat is on the mat". So the first of the above three compounds means "a is on b and b is on c", and the second means "It is not the case that a is on c", that is, a is not on c. You can easily work out the third one for yourself. By means of operations like this (actually, Wittgenstein uses a different, but equivalent operation), one can build up an enormous stock of compound propositions. In fact, according to Wittgenstein, anything that can be said at all can be said by taking elementary propositions and applying operations like this repeatedly (albeit you might have to apply such operations infinitely, or to an infinite collection of propositions). Basically, then, given the simplest pictures of the world, we can stitch them together into more and more complicated pictures, and these yield all the statements and thoughts we can make, or at least all the ones that make any sense. Every meaningful statement ultimately breaks down to elementary propositions, propositions entirely in terms of simple signs or names (like "a" and "b") that stand for logical atoms. Everything that can be said meaningfully can, in principle, be broken down like this. This is the basic idea of logical atomism. Most of the technical work in this book consists of machinery for reducing all propositions of science and mathematics to combinations of elementary propositions. In the process, Wittgenstein shows you, he thinks, how to reduce claims with notions like "all" and "some" (like "All whales are mammals", "Some lawyers are crooks") and numerical claims ("There are four books on the shelf") to combinations of elementary propositions. If Wittgenstein succeeds in this, he considers himself to have shown that his "picture theory" of language is correct. Okay, now you want to know, what's the *philosophical* point of all this？ Well, for one thing, it means that anything you *can't* picture cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition. If you try to speak of things that can't be pictured in Wittgenstein's way, you end up talking nonsense, in that what you are saying won't be true or false. Such utterances may express how you feel, or they may serve some other function (besides saying something) but they won't *say* anything that can be true (or false), and so there won't be any point in *arguing* about it. And what "things" are these, that you can't meaningfully talk about？ The short answer is, all of traditional philosophy. Take ethics, for instance: "things" like right and wrong, or good and bad, can't be pictured, and so ethical "propositions" like "Murder is wrong" don't say anything. Maybe they express your feelings, or reflect some psychological fact, but they are not true or false. Likewise for religious claims that defy picturing, like "God is love" or "Brahman manifests itself in all things". Likewise for metaphysical claims about God or substance or causation or any underlying non-empirical reality. Likewise for epistemological worries about justification or rationality; these cannot be pictured in the requisite way either (hence Wittgenstein dismisses skepticism as nonsense). Wittgenstein's views of language are *so* restrictive that most of what philosophers have wanted to talk about turn out to fall into the category of the unspeakable, what he calls "the mystical". The mystical is what cannot be pictured, what is therefore beyond the realm of logic, reasoning, and articulate speech. About it, Wittgenstein claims, we cannot speak, and therefore we should be silent. Oddly enough, Wittgenstein's own book turns out to be an attempt to talk about the mystical. For one of the things that cannot be pictured, is the very fact, as Wittgenstein takes it to be, that propositions are pictures of reality. (Think about it: how can you make a picture that says that propositions are pictures of reality？ There's no way to do it along the lines of "The cat is on the mat", is there？) In fact, every attempt to talk about the relation between language and reality is itself an attempt to speak of the unspeakable, to attempt to characterize what can't be pictured. Wittgenstein recognizes this and responds thus: "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." ［6.54］ Wittgenstein's Tractatus itself, then, is a violation of his commandment to be silent in the face of the mystical. And once it is *recognized* as a violation, Wittgenstein hopes you will throw the book away and return to the ordinary, empirical world, free of any further desire to do philosophy, having gotten a clear vision of language and the world that makes it obvious to you that philosophy is a mistaken attempt to speak of the unspeakable. (You can now see why this book provokes bitter hostility in those who cherish traditional philosophy--after all, it says they're wasting their time!) But if so, how can Wittgenstein himself be right in writing the book？ Isn't *it* a mistaken attempt to speak about the unspeakable？ Yes and no. Yes, it *is* an attempt to say what can't be said--hence, once you understand it, paradoxically, you see that it's nonsense! But it is not a *mistaken* attempt, rather it is a self-conscious attempt, made necessary by our confusion and unclarity about the world while we are still enmeshed in the tangles of traditional philosophy. While that nonsense imprisons us, we cannot recognize it *as* nonsense, and as such, like mentally deranged people, we have to be approached *with* nonsense if we are to be cured--nonsense is all we respond to. So this book is a kind of curative "nonsense", like a purgative for the soul; it is meant to cleanse the mind of philosophical confusion (that is, of philosophy itself) and, at the end, to remove itself as the final piece of "confusion". To use a computer metaphor, the Tractatus is a program that wipes your whole philosophical "hard drive", and erases itself as its final operation. And after that final erasure, we return to the ordinary world, free of philosophy, in the deafening silence that is our acknowledgement of "das Mystiche"--the mystical in, and above, the ordinary.

《Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus》读后感(四)：哲普：Logical Atomism and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Ludwig Wittgenstein came to Cambridge to study mathematical logic under Russell, but he quickly established himself as his teacher’s intellectual peer. Together, they devised a metaphysical system called “logical atomism.” As discussed at the beginning of Section 2, qua total system, logical atomism seems to have been Wittgenstein’s brainchild. Still, this should not be seen as in any way marginalizing Russell’s significance for the system, which can be described as a metaphysics based on the assumption that an ideal language the likes of which was provided in Principia Mathematica is the key to reality.

According to logical atomism, propositions are built out of elements corresponding to the basic constituents of the world, just as sentences are built out of words. The combination of words in a meaningful sentence mirrors the combination of constituents in the corresponding proposition and also in the corresponding possible or actual state of affairs. That is, the structure of every possible or actual state of affairs is isomorphic with both the structure of the proposition that refers to it and the structure of the sentence that expresses that proposition--so long as the sentence is properly formulated in the notation of symbolic logic. The simplest sort of combination is called an atomic fact because this fact has no sub-facts as part of its structure. An atomic fact for some logical atomists might be something like an individual having a property—a certain leaf’s being green, for instance. Linguistically, this fact is represented by an atomic proposition: for example, “this leaf is green,” or, in logical symbolism “F(a).” Both the fact F(a) and the proposition “F(a)” are called “atomic” not because they themselves are atomic [that is, without structure], but because all their constituents are. Atomic facts are the basic constituents of the world, and atomic propositions are the basic constituents of language.

More complex propositions representing more complex facts are called molecular propositions and molecular facts. The propositions are made by linking atomic propositions together with truth-functional connectives, such as “and,” “or” and “not.” A truth-functional connective is one that combines constituent propositions in such a way that their truth-values (that is, their respective statuses as true or false) completely determine the truth value of the resulting molecular proposition. For instance, the truth value of a proposition of the form “not-p” can be characterized in terms of, and hence treated as determined by, the truth value of “p” because if “p” is true, then “not-p” is false, and if it is false, “not-p” is true. Similarly, a proposition of the form “p and q” will be true if and only if its constituent propositions “p” and “q” are true on their own.

The logic of Principia Mathematica is entirely truth-functional; that is, it only allows for molecular propositions whose truth-values are determined by their atomic constituents. Thus, as Russell observed in the introduction to the second edition of the Principia, “given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods” (Russell 1925, xv). The same assumption—called the thesis of truth-functionality or the thesis of extensionality—lies behind Wittgenstien’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

As mentioned previously, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus proved to be the most influential expression of logical atomism. The Tractatus is organized around seven propositions, here taken from the 1922 translation by C. K. Ogden:

1. The world is everything that is the case.

2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.

3. The logical picture of the facts is the thought.

4. The thought is the significant proposition.

5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)

6. The general form of a truth-function is.... This is the general form of a proposition.

7. Where of one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

The body of the Tractatus consists in cascading levels of numbered elaborations of these propositions (1 is elaborated by 1.1 which is elaborated by 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13, and so forth)—except for 7, which stands on its own. Propositions 1 and 2 establish the metaphysical side of logical atomism: the world is nothing but a complex of atomic facts. Propositions 3 and 4 establish the isomorphism between language and reality: a significant (meaningful) proposition is a "logical picture" of the facts that constitute some possible or actual state of affairs. It is a picture in the sense that the structure of the proposition is identical to the structure of the corresponding atomic facts. It is here, incidentally, that we get the first explicit statement of the metaphilosophical view characteristic of early analytic philosophy: “All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’ ...” (4.0031).

Proposition 5 asserts the thesis of truth-functionality, the view that all complex propositions are built out of atomic propositions joined by truth-functional connectives, and that atomic propositions are truth-functional in themselves. Even existentially quantified propositions are considered to be long disjunctions of atomic propositions. It has since been recognized that a truth-functional logic is not adequate to capture all the phenomena of the world; or at least that, if there is an adequate truth-functional system, we haven't found it yet. Certain phenomena seem to defy truth-functional characterization; for instance, moral facts are problematic. Knowing whether the constituent proposition “p” is true, doesn’t seem to tell us whether “It ought to be the case that p” is true. Similarly problematical are facts about thoughts, beliefs, and other mental states (captured in statements such as “John believes that…”), and modal facts (captured in statements about the necessity or possibility of certain states of affairs). And treating existential quantifiers as long disjunctions doesn’t seem to be adequate for the infinite number of facts about numbers since there surely are more real numbers than there are available names to name them even if we were willing to accept infinitely long disjunctions. The hope that truth-functional logic will prove adequate for resolving all these problems has inspired a good bit of thinking in the analytic tradition, especially during the first half of the twentieth century. This hope lies at the heart of logical atomism.

In its full form, Proposition 6 includes some unusual symbolism that is not reproduced here. All it does, however, is to give a general “recipe” for the creation of molecular propositions by giving the general form of a truth-function. Basically, Wittgenstein is saying that all propositions are truth-functional, and that, ultimately, there is only one kind of truth-function. Principia Mathematica had employed a number of truth-functional connectives: “and,” “or,” “not,” and so forth. However, in 1913 a logician named Henry Sheffer showed that propositions involving these connectives could be rephrased (analyzed) as propositions involving a single connective consisting in the negation of a conjunction. This was called the “not and” or “nand” connective, and was supposed to be equivalent to the ordinary language formulation “not both x and y.” It is usually symbolized by a short vertical line ( | ) called the Sheffer stroke. Though Wittgenstein uses his own idiosyncratic symbolism, this is the operation identified in proposition 6 and some of its elaborations as showing the general form of a truth-function. Replacing the Principia’s plurality of connectives with the “nand” connective made for an extremely minimalistic system—all one needed to construct a complete picture/deｓｃｒｉｐｔion of the world was a single truth-functional connective applied repeatedly to the set of all atomic propositions.

Proposition 7, which stands on its own, is the culmination of a series of observations made throughout the Tractatus, and especially in the elaborations of proposition 6. Throughout the Tractatus there runs a distinction between showing and saying. Saying is a matter of expressing a meaningful proposition. Showing is a matter of presenting something’s form or structure. Thus, as Wittgenstein observes at 4.022, “A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.”

In the introduction to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein indicates that his overarching purpose is to set the criteria and limits of meaningful saying. The structural aspects of language and the world—those aspects that are shown—fall beyond the limits of meaningful saying. According to Wittgenstein, the propositions of logic and mathematics are purely structural and therefore meaningless—they show the form of all possible propositions/states of affairs, but they do not themselves picture any particular state of affairs, thus they do not say anything. This has the odd consequence that the propositions of the Tractatus themselves, which are supposed to be about logic, are meaningless. Hence the famous dictum at 6.54:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Though meaningless, the propositions of logic and mathematics are not nonsense. They at least have the virtue of showing the essential structure of all possible facts. On the other hand, there are concatenations of words, purported propositions, that neither show nor say anything and thus are not connected to reality in any way. Such propositions are not merely senseless, they are nonsense. Among nonsense propositions are included the bulk of traditional philosophical statements articulating traditional philosophical problems and solutions, especially in metaphysics and ethics. This is the consequence of Wittgenstein’s presumption that meaningfulness is somehow linked to the realm of phenomena studied by the natural sciences (cf. 4.11 ff). Thus, as he claims in 6.53:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, that is propositions of natural science—that is something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

In the eyes of its author (as he avers in its Introduction), the real accomplishment of the Tractatus was to have solved, or rather dissolved, all the traditional problems of philosophy by showing that they were meaningless conundrums generated by a failure to understand the limits of meaningful discourse.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/analytic

童鞋们看完再吵= =